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Commonality in Liquidity:  





Recent findings of common factors in liquidity raise many issues pertaining to the determinants 
of commonality and its impact on asset prices. We explore some of these issues using a model of 
liquidity trading in which liquidity shocks are decomposed into common (systematic) and 
idiosyncratic components. We show that common liquidity shocks do not give rise to 
commonality in trading volume, raising questions about the sources of commonality that is 
detected in the literature. Indeed, trading volume is independent of systematic liquidity risk, 
which is always priced independently of the liquidity in the secondary market. In contrast, 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks create liquidity demand and volume, and investors can diversify 
their risk by trading. Hence, the pricing of the risk of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks depends on 
the market’s liquidity, with idiosyncratic liquidity risk being fully priced only in perfectly 
illiquid markets. While trading volume is increasing in the variance of idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks, price volatility is increasing in the variance of both systematic liquidity shocks and 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Surprisingly, our results are largely independent of the number of 
different securities traded in the market. When asset returns are uncorrelated, there is no 
transmission of liquidity across assets even when investors experience common (systematic) 
liquidity shocks, suggesting that such liquidity shocks may not be the source of commonality in 
liquidity across assets detected in the literature. However, under limited conditions, more liquid 
securities can act as substitutes for less liquid securities. Overall, our findings suggest that 
common factors in liquidity may be the outcome of covariation in investor heterogeneity (e.g. as 
measured by co-movements in the volatility of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) rather than of 
common liquidity shocks. Moreover, we find that different liquidity proxies measure different 
things, which has implications for future empirical analysis.   
  3
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the proliferation of financial securities and the markets in which they trade, 
considerable attention has been focused on the role of liquidity in financial markets. While the 
traditional focus of research in this area has been on the liquidity of individual securities, recent 
studies have detected common factors in prices, trading volume, and transactions-cost measures 
such as bid-ask spreads.1 These findings highlight the importance of understanding the 
mechanics by which liquidity demand and supply is transmitted across investors and securities. 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) note that drivers of common factors in liquidity may be 
related to market crashes and other market incidents, pointing to recent incidents such as the 
Summer 1998 collapse of the global bond market and the October 1987 stock market collapse 
which did not seem to be accompanied by any significant news. They also identify as an 
important area of future research the question of whether and to what extent common factors in 
liquidity affect asset prices. 
This paper develops a model aimed at exploring some of the issues pertaining to the 
determinants of commonality and its impact on asset prices. Our model follows the basic 
intuition provided by Karpoff (1986), who characterizes non-informational trading as the 
outcome of differences in personal valuation of assets by investors, due to their differential 
liquidity needs. In our model, liquidity shocks which cause investors to revise their personal 
valuations can have both systematic (i.e. common across all investors) and idiosyncratic 
components. This formulation permits us to examine the transmission of liquidity shocks across 
                                     
1 See, for example, Tkac (1999), Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Gibson and Mougeot (2000), Lo and 
Wang (2000), Huberman and Halka (2001), and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001).  
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assets and across the investor base of individual assets. Indeed, our analysis highlights the 
importance of variations in liquidity demand across investors as a crucial determinant of the 
liquidity of assets they hold. 
Common factors in liquidity seem to imply that liquidity shocks apply systematically 
across investors, and are transmitted across investors and/or securities causing market-wide 
effects. We show that systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks have significantly different 
effects on asset prices, trading volume and volatility. The demand for liquidity arises from 
investor heterogeneity caused by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, and is manifested in trading 
volume. Contingent upon the state of liquidity in the market, trading volume increases with the 
intensity of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (measured by their variance). In contrast, systematic 
liquidity shocks do not give rise to a demand for liquidity or affect trading volume, although they 
have a significant impact on price volatility. The risk of systematic liquidity shocks is always 
priced and is independent of the state of liquidity in the secondary market, since investors are 
unable to diversify this risk by trading.2 The price volatility associated with systematic liquidity 
shocks is also not contingent upon the state of liquidity in the market. Indeed, as in Milgrom and 
Stokey (1982), systematic liquidity shocks will not induce trading even if the market is liquid. In 
contrast, the state of liquidity in the market is very important in the case of idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks. Since investors are differentially impacted by the shocks, they can be transmitted across 
the investor base by trading, to the benefit of all investors. Hence, investors will seek to exploit 
the benefits of trading if the market is liquid and the state of liquidity in the market will 
                                     
2 Gibson and Mougeot (2000) confirm that systematic market liquidity is priced in the US stock market.  
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determine the extent to which the risk of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks is incorporated in the 
price. 
These results suggest the importance of carefully differentiating between systematic and 
idiosyncratic liquidity drivers when using standard liquidity measures as proxies for liquidity. 
They also raise questions about the sources of commonality in liquidity detected in the literature. 
It is especially interesting to observe that systematic liquidity shocks do not cause co-movement 
in volume. Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are the principal determinant of volume, which expands 
as the intensity of these shocks increases. Commonality in the context of recent findings in the 
literature of covariation in volume suggests the existence of covariation in investor 
heterogeneity, as measured, for example, by co-movements in the volatility of idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks experienced by investors. The tax cycle is one potential source of such 
covariation although as conjectured by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), behavioral 
factors may also be at work. Huberman and Halka (2001) conjecture that commonality emerges 
due to noise traders, which is consistent with our model if the volatility of idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks is considered as a proxy for the level of noise in the market.  
We provide new insights into the pricing of illiquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
empirically demonstrate that asset returns are increasing in the cost of transacting (bid-ask 
spread) and hypothesize that in equilibrium, assets with higher bid-ask spreads will be held by 
investors with longer investment time horizons. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) also find a 
significant relationship between required rates of return and measures of illiquidity, after 
adjusting for the Fama and French risk factors and the stock price level. However, Eleswarapu 
and Reinganum (1993) find a significant liquidity premium only in January. As noted by  
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Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), these differences may be due in part to the noisiness of 
transactions cost measures. However, as our analysis suggests, different liquidity variables 
measure different things, which may also be a confounding factor in empirical analysis. 
Moreover, whereas the traditional focus has been on factors related to the supply of liquidity, we 
show that liquidity is the outcome of both demand and supply factors, with the demand side 
having a much more significant and varied impact than previously thought to be the case in the 
literature. When investors have differences in liquidity demand due to differences in their 
exposure to liquidity shocks, we show that investors with lower exposure to liquidity shocks will 
supply liquidity to investors with higher exposure, and benefit from a higher risk-adjusted return 
for doing so. Thus, in addition to receiving higher returns by holding less liquid assets (as in 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986)) low-exposure investors will also receive a higher risk-adjusted 
return than high-exposure investors from the assets that they hold in common. 
Surprisingly, our results are largely independent of the number of different securities 
traded in the market. With multiple securities, systematic liquidity shocks continue to be fully 
priced, since they are, by definition, perfectly correlated across investors, making them 
impossible to diversify by trading. This would be the case even if these shocks were not common 
across assets. In contrast, idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are priced only if they cannot be 
mutualized by trading. Even if idiosyncratic liquidity shocks were common across assets while 
being idiosyncratic across investors, there will be no transmission across assets as long as all 
assets can be freely traded. The only case in which one asset can be a “liquidity substitute” for 
another asset is if liquidity shocks on one asset can be better mitigated by trading another asset, 
which would arise if there were significant liquidity differences between the assets, all else  
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equal. In such cases, the market price of liquid substitutes can be used to benchmark the value of 
illiquid securities. Indeed, in the extreme case when perfectly liquid but otherwise identical 
substitutes exist for illiquid securities, the price discount due to illiquidity should be zero in the 
absence of short-sale constraints. The magnitude of the discounts observed empirically suggests 
that the unavailability of liquid substitutes and/or short sale restrictions may be significant 
impediments to hedging the liquidity risk of illiquid securities in this way.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop the 
benchmark model of our paper. In Section 3, we examine the transmission of liquidity across 
investors, and study the differential effects of systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks on 
asset prices, trading volume and price volatility. In Section 4, we extend the analysis to the case 
of multiple securities to examine liquidity transmission across securities, and study cases in 
which liquid securities can act as substitutes for their illiquid counterparts. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
We consider a two-period, three-date economy with a group of M risk-averse investors. 
We assume that each agent is endowed at time 0 with 1 unit of a single risky asset and 1 unit of 
the riskless asset. The risky asset pays off a random quantity of the numeraire riskless asset, v , at 
time 2, where E(v ) > 1. The return, v , is common knowledge, and is distributed normally with 
mean v  and variance 
2
v σ .  The risk-free return is assumed to be zero. Investors maximize 
negative exponential utility functions of their wealth at time 2,  2 W :  22 () e x p ( ) UW  =       a W −−, 
where a ≥ 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion.  
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All investors experience liquidity shocks at time 1, with the distribution of these shocks 
being known ex ante at time 0. These liquidity shocks can arise due to a broad range of events 
that give rise to a change in the investor’s marginal valuation of the risky asset without new 
information about the fundamental value of the security. Following Karpoff (1986), Michaely 
and Vila (1995), and Michaely, Vila and Wang (1996), we characterize this shock as a random 
additive change,  i θ , to investor i's valuation of the payoff v  from the risky asset.3  i θ  is also 
distributed normally with mean 0 and variance 
2
θ σ , and is independent of v .  
In our model, liquidity shocks can change each investor’s demand for the risky asset, and 
induce trading when it is rational and feasible for an investor to do so. Unlike in Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980), where the magnitude of liquidity trades is specified exogenously, liquidity 
trading is discretionary in our model since investors have the ability to rationally determine the 
size of their trades after taking account of all the costs and benefits of rebalancing their 
portfolios. 
We assume that in general, liquidity shocks can be decomposed into normally distributed 
systematic and idiosyncratic components: 
  ii i θ γδ ε = +    (1) 
 
                                     
3 In general, liquidity shocks can be caused by changes in preferences (Tobin (1965), and Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983)), changes in endowments (Glosten (1989), Madhavan (1992), Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991), and Spiegel 
and Subrahmanyam (1992)), or changes in personal valuations due to taxes and other non-informational reasons 
(Karpoff (1986), Michaely and Vila (1995), and Michaely, Vila and Wang (1996)), that change each investor’s 




where δ, the systematic component, is perfectly correlated across all investors, whereas  i ε  , the 
idiosyncratic component, is assumed to be identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) 
across investors. δ is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 
2
δ σ  while  i ε   is 
normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 
2
ε σ . 0 i γ ≥  measures investor i’s 
exposure to the systematic liquidity shock.4 
Liquidity shocks affect investors’ marginal valuation of the risky asset and lead them to 
optimally rebalance their portfolios by trading shares in the risky asset when this is possible. 
There are no restrictions on short holdings of the risky asset.  
We assume that trading in the secondary market at time 1 occurs in a simple batch market 
where all trades clear at the same price subject to transactions costs. For tractability, we assume 
a transactions cost formulation that is commonly used in the literature:
 5 
  i i X P P 1 1 1 ∆ + = λ  (2) 
 
0 λ ≥  is the transactions cost parameter,  1 P  is the market-clearing price in the absence of 
transactions costs,  i X1 ∆  is the trade size of individual i, and  i P 1  is the actual price paid or 
received by individual i. 
In general, the portfolio selection problem of individual i may be expressed as: 
                                     
4 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this formulation. 
5 See, for example, Kyle (1985), and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996). The market microstructure that gives rise 
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where   ti W   =  wealth of individual i at the end of time t; 
t P    =  price of risky asset at time t (in units of the riskless asset);  
ti X   =  amount of risky asset held by individual i at the end of time t; and 
i TC  =  transactions cost (
2
1i X λ∆ ) incurred by individual i in rebalancing time 1 portfolio. 
 
Given our assumption of negative exponential utility, (3) can be stated as: 
  { }
01
2
01 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0  max max exp ( ) ( ) ( )
ii
ii i i ii
XX EE a W X P P X v P X X θλ    −− + − + + − − −    
      (4)   
 
Individuals solve this portfolio problem recursively. In the rest of the paper, we use this model to 
examine how liquidity shocks affect an investor’s portfolio selection decision, and study the 
implications for liquidity transmission across investors and securities in order to better 
understand the causes and consequences of commonality in liquidity. 
 
3. TRANSMISSION OF LIQUIDITY ACROSS INVESTORS 
  In this section we examine how systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks affect the 
transmission of liquidity across investors, and the impact they have on overall market liquidity  
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and asset prices. We also analyze the implications for trading volume and price volatility in order 
to link our results to the existing literature on commonality in liquidity. We begin by presenting 
the general case in which investors are affected by liquidity shocks consisting of heterogeneous 
systematic and idiosyncratic components. Thereafter, we examine special cases to derive closed-
form solutions and to strengthen the insights provided by our model.  
 
3.1 Asset Pricing and Liquidity Transmission across Investors 
The general case where investor i experiences a liquidity shock of  i θ  as specified by (1) 
gives rise to both ex ante and ex post differences across investors due to liquidity shocks. The ex 
ante differences arise because investors have different exposures ( i γ ) to systematic liquidity 
shocks. The ex post differences arise because of the differences across investors in the realization 
of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Thus, as in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), investors will make 
their time 0 portfolio decisions not only by rationally anticipating their time 1 liquidity needs but 
also by taking account of the currently known differences across the investor base. Since the 
effect of differences in  i γ  across the investor base is to create differences in the incidence of 
systematic liquidity shocks, this will cause investors who are less impacted by systematic shocks 
(possibly because of portfolio composition or hedging strategies exogenous to the model) to 
benefit by providing liquidity to those investors who are more impacted by systematic shocks. 
Lemma 1 summarizes the key results for the time 1 equilibrium. 
   
  12
Lemma 1. At time 1, the market clearing price, 1 P , and the equilibrium holding of the risky asset 
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are the average exposure to systematic liquidity shocks and the average incidence of 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, respectively, across the investor base.  
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
While all investors experience systematic liquidity shocks, only  ˆ
A γ δ , the average 
systematic shock (which represents the undiversifiable component) is reflected in the price. The 
“idiosyncratic” component of the systematic liquidity shock experienced by investor 
i, ˆ () iA γγ δ − , is mutualized by trading at time 1, as reflected in the expression for 1i X . It would be 
noted that in this sense,  ˆ () iA γ γδ −  manifests itself identically to the idiosyncratic shock  
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experienced by investor i, ˆi ε .6 Thus, differences in exposure to systematic liquidity shocks 
alleviate the impact of these shocks and lead to partial risk sharing through trading between high 
and low-exposure investors. We explore this risk-sharing in more detail later. 
Although transactions costs do not affect the equilibrium price at time 1, they have an 
impact on trading volume. We examine the impact of liquidity shocks on price volatility and 
trading volume in Subsection 3.2 under different assumptions about transactions costs.  
In order to solve for the equilibrium at time 0, we need to make a specific assumption 
about the distribution of  i γ across the investor base. As we noted previously, systematic liquidity 
shocks in the general case can be divided into uniform (undiversifiable) and idiosyncratic 
components. Since the latter component is already captured in our formulation through i ε  , we 
lose little generality by assuming that systematic shocks consist only of the average component 
in the previous formulation,  ˆ
A γ δ . Specifically, we assume that  1 iA γ γ = = .7 This assumption 
makes all investors ex ante identical at t = 0.8  
                                     
6 For finite M, idiosyncratic shocks also contain an undiversifiable component,  ˆA ε . Unlike ˆ
A γ δ , however, 
ˆ 0 A ε → as M →∞. 
7 Alternatively, we could assume a specific distribution for  i γ that is non-uniform across investors but this also 
reduces to the current case of a uniform systematic component and an idiosyncratic component. Ex ante 
heterogeneity across investors, the feature in the general model that we lose by this assumption, is explored more 
fully in Subsection 3.3 in the context of liquidity risk-sharing across investors. 
8 It will be observed that in the case where  i γ is equal across all investors, the systematic component, δ , manifests 
itself identically to a shock to the fundamental payoff of the risky asset. The same effect will result if investors 
experience a systematic shock to their endowments or preferences. A systematic liquidity shock that impacts all 
investors with equal intensity, regardless of how it originates, causes all investors to revise their valuation of the 
risky asset identically. In this sense, a systematic liquidity shock is “fundamental,” making it more difficult to 
empirically differentiate it from a shock to the asset’s fundamental returns. This difficulty, which persists with all 
formulations of systematic liquidity shocks, does not detract from the importance of understanding the consequences 
of such shocks, and differentiating their effect from that of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. 
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Noting that 0 1 i X = , Lemma 2 states the result for the time 0 equilibrium price. 
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Proof.  See Appendix. 
 
In the case considered here where all investors are ex ante identical, they will hold their 
initial endowments in equilibrium at time 0, in contrast to time 1 when idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks are realized. By trading with each other, the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are transmitted 
across investors as the rational response to the valuation changes caused by the shocks.  
The price at time 0 incorporates a discount for the liquidity risk that investors face at time 
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The transactions cost parameter, λ, is a proxy for the external factors that determine market 
liquidity at time 1, and parameterizes the liquidity continuum between the case in which the time 
1 market is frictionless, when  0 λ = , and the case in which it is perfectly illiquid (de facto  
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closed), when λ →∞. Conditional on a given distribution of liquidity shocks, the size of the 
market as measured by the number of investors, M, also determines its liquidity. This can be seen 
by examining the limiting case of  1 M =  in which the market will, by definition, be perfectly 
illiquid. A frictionless market in which M →∞can be thought of as a perfectly liquid market. 
For a given value of  1 M > , the time 0 equilibrium price 0 P  decreases monotonically with 
the transactions cost parameter λ. This price decline reflects the corresponding increase in the 
discount for illiquidity, Ф, as the cost of trading in the secondary market rises.  
Our principal conclusions on the pricing of liquidity risk follow directly from Lemmas 1 
and 2, and are stated in Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 (Pricing of Liquidity Risk). The pricing of idiosyncratic liquidity risk is contingent 
upon the state of liquidity in the market, whereas systematic liquidity risk is always priced and is 
independent of the state of liquidity in the secondary market. The systematic liquidity risk 
premium 
2 a δ σ  is increasing in the variance of systematic liquidity shocks. Idiosyncratic liquidity 
risk is fully priced only if the secondary market is perfectly illiquid, and unpriced if the 
secondary market is perfectly liquid. The idiosyncratic liquidity risk premium 
2 a ε σ  is increasing 
in the variance of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. 
 
The result for systematic liquidity risk parallels the no-trade equilibrium in Milgrom and 
Stokey (1982). If liquidity shocks are common to all investors, they cannot be diversified away 
by trading, nor will they induce trading even if the market is liquid. At time 1, the price will  
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simply adjust without trading to reflect the systematic liquidity shock and at time 0, the risk of 
the systematic liquidity shock will be fully discounted in the price. 
In contrast, the state of liquidity in the market is critical in the case of idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks. Since investors are differentially impacted by the shocks, they can potentially 
be transmitted across the investor base by trading, to the benefit of all investors. Hence, investors 
will seek to exploit the benefits of trading if the market is liquid. The extent to which the risk of 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks is incorporated in the price depends on the state of liquidity in the 
market, which in turn is determined by λ and M.  When  0 λ =  and M →∞, idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks will no longer be priced since investors are able to perfectly offset the effect of 
the shocks in the market. On the other hand, idiosyncratic liquidity shocks will be fully priced 
when the market is perfectly illiquid, when λ →∞or M = 1. 
In the following subsections, we further investigate issues pertaining to volume and 
volatility in the context of systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, as well as the impact of 
investor heterogeneity on a security’s liquidity and pricing. 
 
3.2 Volume and Volatility 
Trading arises at time 1 in the secondary market when individual valuations of the 
security differ from the market price because of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. This leads to the 
trade of marginal quantities until the price in equilibrium equals each investor's marginal 
valuation. Noting that when  1 i γ =  all investors, being ex ante identical, will hold their initial 
endowments in the time 0 equilibrium, i.e. 0 1 i X = , the equilibrium time 1 trade size for 
individual i,  110 iii X XX ∆= −, becomes  
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1i X ∆  is perfectly positively correlated with the differential between his individual liquidity 
shock and the average shock to the aggregate base of investors. If his personalized valuation at 
time 1 due to the shock exceeds the price in the market, he will exercise his choice to buy the 
risky asset. Likewise, if his personalized valuation is less than the market price, he will sell the 




















The expected individual and market-wide trading volume follow directly from (8) and are 
presented in Lemma 3.  
 
Lemma 3. The expected size of each individual's trade is given by: 
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 (9) 
and the expected total volume of trade in the market,  1 Q , is: 















Proof.  See Appendix. 
 
The result for price volatility is presented in Lemma 4.  
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Lemma 4. If 
2









Proof.  Follows directly from (5) for the case of  1 i γ = . 
 
These results establish the relationship between liquidity shocks, and volume of trade and 
price volatility in the secondary market. Proposition 2 summarizes the key result of this 
subsection. 
 
Proposition 2 (Volume and Volatility). Common (systematic) liquidity shocks do not affect 
trading volume. Trading volume increases with the variance of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and 
decreases with transactions costs.  Both common (systematic) and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks 
affect price volatility. The price volatility associated with systematic liquidity shocks is not 
contingent upon the state of liquidity in the market, and is increasing in the variance of 
systematic liquidity shocks. Contingent upon a liquid market at time 1, the price volatility 
associated with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks is increasing in the variance of idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks and decreasing in M. 
 
These results suggest the importance of carefully differentiating between systematic and 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks when using standard liquidity measures as proxies for liquidity. In 
particular, systematic liquidity shocks exacerbate price volatility but have no effect on trading  
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volume. The state of liquidity in the market is another important determinant of these liquidity 
measures. While the state of liquidity in the market depends on whether it is open for trading and 
if so, the cost of undertaking transactions, it will also depend on the degree to which investors 
are exposed to liquidity shocks, and thus, the level of liquidity that they demand. In the next 
subsection, we further examine the sharing of liquidity risk across investors arising from their 
differential exposure to systematic liquidity shocks. 
 
3.3 Sharing of Liquidity Risk across Heterogeneous Investors 
In Subsection 3.1, we noted that when investors have non-uniform exposure to systematic 
liquidity shocks, they would in general be heterogeneous at time 0. In that case we observed 
partial risk-sharing across investors through trading at time 1. We also noted that ex ante 
differences could also affect portfolio decisions at time 0. In this subsection, we examine this 
specific question, using simplifying assumptions to preserve tractability. We first study the 
general case of liquidity shocks under special assumptions about transactions costs. Specifically, 
we examine in turn the two polar cases of a perfectly liquid market ( 0 λ = ) and a perfectly 
illiquid market (λ →∞) at time 1. Next, we assume a specific non-uniform distribution of 
systematic liquidity shocks to examine risk sharing through differences in portfolio holding at 
time 0. Since we have previously considered the comparative statics associated with M, we 
simplify the analysis by assuming that M →∞, causing  ˆ 0 A ε → .  
Lemma 5 states the result for the time 0 equilibrium price and holding of the risky asset 
for the general case of liquidity shocks when the time 1 market is perfectly liquid. 
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Lemma 5. When the secondary market at time 1 is perfectly liquid, the time 0 market clearing 
price,
*
0 P  and the equilibrium holding of the risky asset by investor i,
*
0i X  respectively, are: 
 
*2 2 2 *
00 ;1 vA i Pv a a X δ σγ σ =− − =  (11) 
 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
 
Interestingly, despite their ex ante differences, all investors hold the same portfolio at 
time 0 since the perfectly liquid market enables them to respond to their liquidity shocks by 
trading costlessly at time 1. Therefore, no prior hedging by rebalancing portfolios at time 0 takes 
place. As suggested by Proposition 1, only the average systematic liquidity shock (the 
undiversifiable component) is priced. Investors who have a low exposure to the systematic 
liquidity shock will reap the benefit of a lower price at time 0 than would be justified by the 
liquidity risk that they bear. In contrast, investors who have a high exposure to systematic 
liquidity shocks will pay a higher price than would be justified by their liquidity risk. This is the 
cost of being able to transfer their liquidity risk to low-exposure investors by trading with them 
in the liquid market at time 1. 
The situation changes when the time 1 market is perfectly illiquid. In this case, the option 
to rebalance portfolios in the secondary market is no longer available, and investors need to take 
account of this knowledge when making their portfolio decisions at time 0. We state the first 
order condition for this case in Lemma 6 below. 
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Lemma 6. When the secondary market at time 1 is perfectly illiquid, the investor’s portfolio 
problem collapses to a single-period problem in which the time 0 first order condition becomes: 
 
22 2 2
00 () 0 vi i vPa  X δε σγ σσ −− + + =  (12) 
 
Proof.  The two-period problem collapses to a single-period problem. The proof parallels the 
proof of Lemma 1. 
 
Noting that in (12)  i γ  is the only term that differs across investors, we can observe that in 
equilibrium, investors with a high exposure to systematic liquidity shocks will hold a lower 
amount 0i X  of the risky asset at time 0 than investors with a low exposure. 
To explore this point further, and to examine market clearing, equilibrium prices and 
holdings at time 0, we need to impose a distribution for the  i γ  across the investor base. Unlike 
previously when we assumed a uniform distribution in which case there would be no potential 
for risk sharing at time 0, we assume that the investor base consists of two investor clienteles. A 
fraction φ  is of type 1, for whom  1 i γ = . The rest of the investor base is of type 2, for whom 
0 i γ = .  
When the market is perfectly liquid, the equilibrium price and holding at time 0 become: 
 
*2 2 2 *
00 ;1 vi Pv a a X δ σφ σ = −− =  (13) 
The result here is consistent with (11) for the general case. Type 2 investors obtain an additional 
return of 
22 a δ φ σ  for meeting the liquidity needs of type 1 investors at time 1, while type 1  
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investors forego a return of 
22 (1 ) a δ φ σ −  for the benefit of the option to alleviate the systematic 
component of their liquidity risk at time 1.  
As we have noted, when the market is perfectly illiquid at time 1, due to the differences 
in liquidity demand across the two clienteles, equilibrium holdings of the risky asset at time 0 
need not in general be identical across the two clienteles. We assume that in equilibrium, type 1 
investors hold a fraction µ  of the risky asset, with type 2 investors holding the remainder.  From 
the optimal choice of type 1 investors, we obtain the following expression from (12) for the time 









=− + +  (14) 


















The equilibrium values ofµ  and  0 P  are stated in Lemma 7 below. 
 
Lemma 7. When the secondary market is perfectly illiquid, the fraction of the risky asset held in 



































+−   +   
  +
=− + +   ++ − + +  
 (16) 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
It is observed that in the time 0 equilibrium, type 2 investors hold more of the risky asset 
than type 1 investors do. Type 1 investors are exposed to a higher risk from their holdings of the 
risky asset due to their higher exposure. Thus, since they are not able trade this asset after 
observing their liquidity shocks, type 1 investors hedge the effect of the anticipated shock by 
selling a part of their endowment to the type 2 investors who are not exposed to the systematic 
component of liquidity risk that type 1 investors face. 
The pricing result in the case of an illiquid time 1 market is also interesting. We denote 
the valuations attached by type 1 and type 2 investors at time 0 to their initial endowments (i.e. 
prior to any portfolio rebalancing at time 0) as
1
0 P  and 
2
0 P , which are given by 
12 2 2
0 () v Pv a δ ε σ σσ =− + +  and 
22 2
0 () v Pv a ε σ σ =− + . We observe the following relationship 
relative to the equilibrium price at time 0: 
 
1*2
000 PPP ≤ ≤  (17)  
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If only type 2 investors populated the investor base, the price they would pay for the risky asset 
is higher since holding the asset does not expose them to systematic liquidity risk. The 
equilibrium price is lowered due to the presence of the type 1 investors, who transfer a part of 
their liquidity risk to type 2 investors by selling them part of their endowment in the primary 
(time 0) market. Thus, while type 2 investors hold more of the risky illiquid asset, they are 
compensated for doing so by the price differential between the two cases, permitting them to 
earn a higher return. This result is consistent with and extends the intuition in Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) where the liquidity needs of investor clienteles are measured by holding 
period, and investors who have a longer holding period (lower liquidity need) earn a higher 
return. 
Proposition 3 summarizes the key result of this subsection. 
 
Proposition 3 (Sharing of liquidity risk across investors). When the secondary market is 
perfectly liquid, high exposure investors will seek to manage their risk by trading with low 
exposure investors after observing their liquidity shocks.  When the secondary market is 
perfectly illiquid, high exposure investors will seek to manage their risk by reducing their 
holdings of the risky asset in the primary market in anticipation of future shocks. In either case, 
low exposure investors will earn a higher risk-adjusted return, as a reward for the transmission 
to them of the liquidity risk of high exposure investors. 
 
This section has discussed commonality of liquidity shocks across investors for the case 
of a single risky asset, both when investors are ex ante identical and when they differ due to their  
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exposure to systematic liquidity shocks. Next, we turn to the case of multiple assets and the 
transmission of liquidity across assets as well as investors. 
 
4. TRANSMISSION OF LIQUIDITY ACROSS SECURITIES 
 
In this section, we examine the case in which investors hold multiple risky assets, to 
study liquidity transmission and commonality across securities. We develop our basic results for 
the general multi-security case and examine specific examples in the context of two risky assets. 
As in Section 3, we begin our analysis with our general formulation of liquidity shocks (adapted 
for the case with multiple securities) and transactions costs, before moving to specific cases. 
 
4.1 Systematic and Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks with Multiple Assets 
We assume that individuals have the same preferences as before and are endowed with 
one unit of the riskless asset and one unit each of K risky assets, indexed by k, k = 1,..., K. As 
before, risky asset k pays off a random quantity of the numeraire riskless asset, 
k v  , at time 2, 
where ( ) 1
k Ev >  . The 
k v  , k = 1,..., K, are identically and independently (i.i.) normally distributed 
with mean v  and variance 
2
v σ .  The risk-free return is assumed to be zero as before. Since we 
have previously studied the comparative statics associated with variations in the size of the 
investor base, M, we simplify the analysis in this section by assuming that  . M →∞ All investors 
experience liquidity shocks at time 1, which are characterized as random additive increments,  
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k
i θ , to the payoff 
k v   of the risky asset to investor i. As in the single-asset case, 
k
i θ  can be 
decomposed into normally distributed systematic and idiosyncratic components: 
 
kk
ii i θ γδ ε = +    (18) 
where δ, the systematic component, impacts investor i with an exposure of  0 i γ ≥ . Thus, the 
systematic component is, by design, common across the asset base. In contrast,
k
i ε  , the 
idiosyncratic component, is assumed to be i.i.d. across both investors and assets. δ has a mean 
of 0 and a variance of 
2
δ σ  while 
k
i ε   has a mean of 0 and a variance of 
2
ε σ . We assume that the 
transactions cost parameter, λ, is uniform across assets. 
The individual's problem in this case is: 
 
{} {} 01 11
2
01 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
11 1
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    
−− + − + + − − −     
       
∑∑ ∑      (19) 
where 0
k
i X  and 1
k
i X  are the time 0 and time 1 holdings of asset k by individual i. Paralleling the 
single-asset case, we state the key results for the time 1 equilibrium in Lemmas 8. 
 
Lemma 8. The market clearing price at time 1,  1
k P , and the equilibrium holding of asset k by 
investor i,  1
k




























where  ˆ δ  and  ˆ
k
i ε  are the realizations of δ and 
k
i ε  , respectively.  
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Proof. Parallels proof of Lemma 1 for the single-asset case. 
 
Surprisingly, it can be seen from Lemma 8 that the results for each individual asset in the 
multi-asset case are identical to those obtained in Lemma 1 for the single asset case. In 
particular, we observe no spillover of liquidity effects across assets. The systematic component 
of liquidity shocks is reflected only in the equilibrium price at time 1, whereas the idiosyncratic 
component of liquidity shocks is reflected only in the equilibrium asset holding. Although it 










this component pertains only to the investor-specific “idiosyncratic” element of the common 
liquidity shock that applies to each specific asset. This can be easily seen by setting  iA γ γ =  
which makes the systematic shock common across both assets and investors, causing it to 
completely disappear from holdings.  Hence, as in the single-asset case, liquidity matters only if 
liquidity shocks are heterogeneous across investors. If liquidity shocks are systematic, investors 
cannot trade and the availability of liquidity will not be a factor. Thus, prices will simply adjust 
without trade. If liquidity shocks are idiosyncratic across investors and assets, liquidity will be 
transmitted across investors by trading, and since M →∞, the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks will 
be perfectly mutualized. However, there’s no transmission of liquidity across assets even in this 
case. 
We next turn to the market equilibrium at time 0. As in the single-asset case, in order to 
solve completely for the equilibrium at time 0 we need to make specific assumptions about the  
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distribution of  i γ across the investor base, and about transactions costs. As before, we assume 
that 1 iA γ γ ==  and restrict our analysis to the two polar cases of perfectly liquid and perfectly 
illiquid markets. 
 
Lemma 9. If there is trading at time 1, the equilibrium price of asset k at time 0,  0





v Pv a K a δ σ σ =− −  (21) 
If the market is not open for trading at time 1,  0





v Pv a K aa δ ε σ σ =− − −  (22) 
 
Proof. Parallels proofs of Lemma 2 for the case  0 λ = , and Lemma 6, respectively. 
 
We state the main result of this subsection in Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4 (Liquidity transmission across securities). When asset returns are uncorrelated, 
there is no transmission of liquidity across assets even when investors experience common 
(systematic) liquidity shocks. Systematic liquidity shocks are always fully priced, whereas 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are priced only if they cannot be mutualized by trading. 
 
Thus, it is seen that the results for the multi-security case exactly parallel our benchmark 
case with a single risky asset. It is especially important to note that despite a multiplicity of risky 
assets, there is no transmission of liquidity across assets in the above case. Since systematic  
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shocks are, by definition, perfectly correlated across investors, there is no possibility to eliminate 
their effect by trading. As shown in (20), systematic shocks are simply reflected in the 
equilibrium price, without trading. This would be the case even if these shocks were not common 
across assets. Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are perfectly mutualized by trading in each asset, 
without spillover effects across assets. Thus, they are reflected in volume but not in price, since 
the mutualization is perfect when M →∞. Even if idiosyncratic liquidity shocks were common 
across assets while being idiosyncratic across investors, there will be no transmission across 
assets as long as all assets can be freely traded. Thus, the only case in which liquidity 
transmission across assets will occur is if liquidity shocks on one group of assets can be better 
mitigated by trading another group of assets, which would arise if liquidity shocks are correlated 
across the two groups of assets while there being significant liquidity differences across the two 
groups. We turn to this case next.  
 
4.2 Liquidity Transmission from Liquid to Illiquid Assets 
Due to the increased complexity introduced by the assumption of correlated asset returns 
in this subsection, we examine the special case of K = 2 in which liquidity shocks are common 
(i.e. perfectly correlated) across the two risky assets but idiosyncratic across investors. Thus, in 
this case, 
kk
iii θ εε ==   . We compare three subcases: 
a.  Both assets perfectly liquid; 
b.  Both assets perfectly illiquid; and 
c.  Asset 1 is perfectly liquid while Asset 2 is perfectly illiquid.  
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In “a)”, since M →∞, investors will be able to completely eliminate the risk of liquidity 
shocks by trading with each other. Hence, this risk will not be priced and the time 0 equilibrium 
price will be 
2
0 ;1 , 2
k
v Pv a k σ =− = . Since both assets are liquid, they will trade independently, 

















 in each case. 
From the standpoint of liquidity risk, “b)” is the polar opposite of “a)”. The inability to 
trade the assets means that investors will be fully exposed to the risk of liquidity shocks. Hence, 
this risk will be fully priced, yielding a time 0 equilibrium price of 
22
0 2; 1 , 2 .
k
v   Pv a a k ε σσ =− − =  
In “c)”, the individual's problem becomes: 
  () { } 12 1
00 1
11 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
01 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
,
max max exp ( ) ( ) ( )
ii i
ii i i i i
XX X
EE a W X P P X vP X vP εε   −− + − + + − + + −   
   (23) 
where the notation follows (19). Lemma 10 states the relevant results for the time 1 and time 0 
equilibria. 
 
Lemma 10. When Asset 1 is perfectly liquid and Asset 2 is perfectly illiquid, the equilibrium 


























 (24)  
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Proof. Parallels proofs of Lemma 1, and Lemma 2 for the case  0 λ = , respectively. 
 
The comparison, especially across cases “a)” and “c)” is interesting. Intuitively, since the 
liquidity shock is common across the two assets, one would expect transmission of liquidity in 
“c)” from Asset 1 to Asset 2. This is not what we find. The optimal holding of Asset 1, and 
therefore the optimal trade size in response to the liquidity shock, is the same in “a)” and “c)”. 
On the other hand, there is a differential price impact across the three cases associated with the 
pricing of liquidity risk. As we would expect, liquidity risk is not priced for Asset 1 in either “a)” 
or “c)”, whereas for Asset 2, the price in “c)” includes a liquidity risk premium of 
2 a ε σ . 
However, in “b)”, where both assets are illiquid, the liquidity risk premium is 
2 2a ε σ . In “c)”, the 
investor’s “total exposure” to liquidity risk is lowered, since the liquidity risk associated with 
Asset 1 can be completely mitigated by trading at time 1. However, this does not affect trading 
volume, and from the standpoint of Asset 1, “a)” and “c)” are identical. Hence, despite the 
commonality in liquidity shocks, Asset 1 remains independent of Asset 2.  
These results are somewhat surprising. In order to gain further insight into the issue of 
liquidity transmission across assets, we examine how the results in “a)” and “c)” above change 
when Asset 1 is a perfect substitute for Asset 2, i.e. their payoffs 
1 v   and 
2 v   are also identical. 
When both assets are perfectly liquid as in “a)”, the relevant results from the time 1 and time 0 
equilibria are stated in Lemma 11. 
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Lemma 11. When the assets are perfectly liquid and their payoffs are perfectly correlated, the 
























Proof. Parallels proofs of Lemma 1, and Lemma 2 for the case  0 λ = , respectively. 
 
When Asset 1 is perfectly liquid while Asset 2 is perfectly illiquid, as in “c)”, the relevant time 1 
and time 0 results are stated in Lemma 12. 
 
Lemma 12. When Asset 1 is perfectly liquid while Asset 2 is perfectly illiquid, and their payoffs 

























Proof. Parallels proofs of Lemma 1, and Lemma 2 for the case  0 λ = , respectively. 
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The comparison of these results is interesting. The illiquidity of Asset 2 in the second 
case is not a factor in pricing. The ability to trade Asset 1 permits investors to transfer the entire 













 in the case where only Asset 1 is liquid. 
Thus, the two assets are perfect substitutes, and transmission of liquidity occurs from Asset 1 to 
Asset 2, allowing investors to perfectly offset the illiquidity of Asset 2 by trading in Asset 1. 
Thus, as suggested by Huberman and Halka (2001), the availability of substitutes will 
give rise to liquidity transmission across assets and commonality in liquidity. The spillover 
effects in volume are as in Caballe and Krishnan (1994) and seem to occur only when 
fundamentals are also correlated, regardless of whether or not liquidity shocks are correlated as 
well. Our model captures these spillover effects only imperfectly since Asset 2 is assumed to be 
perfectly illiquid. However, it is not difficult to visualize the more general case in which both 
assets are partially but differentially liquid, where a liquidity shock to one asset causes co-
movement in volume across the two assets. 
These results have useful implications for the valuation of illiquid securities. Since these 
securities are, by definition, traded only infrequently if at all, they cannot be accurately valued 
based on market prices. Our analysis suggests that at least in some situations, the market prices 
of liquid substitutes can be used to benchmark the value of illiquid securities. Our framework 
may be especially relevant for valuing restricted stocks and other securities which are privately  
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placed issues of public corporations.9 Restricted stocks are frequently issued by public 
companies and are identical to their publicly placed counterparts in all respects except that they 
are subject to trading restrictions. These restrictions are formidable and are designed to 
effectively force the purchaser to withhold the securities from public trading for the duration of 
the restricted period, except when exceptional circumstances justify the cost of overcoming these 
restrictions.  
These restrictions appear to induce a significant discount in the price of restricted 
securities compared to their publicly traded counterparts. Wruck (1989) reports an average 
discount of 14% in a sample of 83 sales of NYSE and AMEX firms making private sales of 
restricted shares between July 1979 and December 1985. In contrast, a sample of 45 sales of 
registered securities during the same period reveals a premium of 4%. Silber (1991) reports an 
average discount of 33.75% in his study of the impact of illiquidity on restricted stock. 
Our analysis suggests that when liquid but otherwise identical substitutes exist for 
illiquid securities, the price discount due to illiquidity should be zero. As noted previously, the 
intuition for this result is trivial -- if an investor wishes to reduce (increase) his holding in an 
illiquid security, he can short sell (buy) the liquid substitute. The magnitude of the discounts 
observed empirically suggests that the unavailability of liquid substitutes and/or short sale 
restrictions may be significant impediments to hedging the liquidity risk of illiquid securities in 
                                     
9 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 1971) classifies restricted securities as securities acquired from 
an issuer in a transaction (private placement) exempt from registration as stipulated in the Securities Act of 1933. 
The basis for this exemption is that the transaction is not a public offering and the securities are privately placed with 
a group of investors who do not need the usual public stock issue protections offered by the Securities Act. Investors 
who buy these securities are required to provide a letter of undertaking that they are being bought for long-term 
investment purposes.  
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this way. However, it is not possible to rule out significant levels of mispricing, especially since 
restricted securities are typically placed on a negotiated basis that relies on long-standing 
industry norms about the “appropriate” discount for illiquidity. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has explored some of the issues raised by recent findings of common factors 
in liquidity. We have examined how such common factors could arise and what impact they 
might have on asset prices. Differentiating between systematic and idiosyncratic components of 
liquidity shocks has permitted us to more thoroughly analyze these questions. Surprisingly, 
common liquidity shocks do not give rise to commonality in trading volume. Covariation in 
standard liquidity measures such as volume requires covariation in the levels of investor 
heterogeneity. Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, which give rise to investor heterogeneity, create 
liquidity demand and volume. Investors can potentially diversify their risk by trading, and 
therefore, the pricing of idiosyncratic liquidity risk depends on the market’s liquidity. Our results 
are largely independent of the number of different securities traded in the market, lending 
support to our conjecture about commonality being the outcome of covariation in investor 
heterogeneity rather than of systematic liquidity shocks.  
We have advanced the notion that understanding the structure of liquidity demand is key 
to understanding the economic effects of liquidity. Since investors are likely to fall into a wide 
variety of clienteles with regard to their liquidity demand, this issue is important from an 
empirical standpoint. Furthermore, this is also likely to be an important consideration for  
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companies that have the choice of targeting their securities to different investor clienteles and/or 
markets.  
The theoretical framework presented here provides a useful basis for further empirical 
investigations on the role of liquidity in asset pricing, and differentiating between systematic and 
idiosyncratic drivers of liquidity. Subject to the prevailing market structure, volume is the 
manifestation of investor heterogeneity arising from idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, while price 
volatility is largely the manifestation of systematic liquidity shocks. Differentiating between 
these effects is key to determining the economic effects of liquidity.  
Many questions remain. Our analysis implies that the supply of liquidity will arise 
endogenously from liquidity demand, in addition to other factors such as market structure and 
the presence of informed trading. In the past, this issue has been approached largely from the 
standpoint of asymmetric information models, with uninformed traders being assumed to have 
limited discretion in trading, if at all. In contrast, we provide a microscopic examination of 
liquidity-driven trading to the exclusion of information-driven trading. A combination of the two 
will provide a richer framework to analyze the origins and consequences of liquidity variations. 
Finally, our analysis has shown that different liquidity variables measure different things due to 
the differential impact of systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Moreover, whereas the 
traditional focus has been on factors related to the supply of liquidity, we show that liquidity is 
the outcome of both demand and supply factors, with the demand side having a much more 
significant and varied impact than previously thought to be the case in the literature. The 
implications of these new insights will need to be considered in future empirical analysis.   
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The investor’s time 1 problem can be expressed as: 
  { }
1
2
11 1 1 1 0 ˆ max exp ( ) ( )
i
ii i ii X Ea W X v P X X θλ    −− + + − − −    
    (A.1) 
which yields the first order condition: 
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Noting that  ˆˆ ˆ ii i θ γδ ε =+ , and aggregating across all investors, we obtain the market clearing 
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  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
At time 0, the individual's problem becomes: 
 
  { }
01
2
01 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0  max max exp ( ) ( ) ( )
ii
ii i i ii XX EE a W X P P X v P X X θλ    −− + − + + − − −    
      (A.5)   
which is equivalent to: 
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1i X  , 
*
1 P   are the optimal time 1 holding and equilibrium price, respectively, both normally 
distributed variables from the perspective of time 0. This is of the form: 
  { }
0
00 0 max exp ( )
i
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Substituting from the time 1 first order condition, Z   reduces to: 
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  and  iiA θ θθ ∆=−  . This expression is of the form: 
 
2 () ( )( ) ii A Z   A B E F θ θθ =+∆ + ∆ +     (A.10) 
where A, B, E and F are non-random. From the moment generating function of Z  , 
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θ σ ∆  and 
2
A θ σ  are the variances of  i θ ∆   and  A θ , respectively. Taking the first order 







= ∑ , we obtain the market clearing price at 































σσ =+ (A.14) 
and 
 




=  (A.15) 
yields the expression for  0 P  in (6). 
  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
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 (A.18) 
and the expected total volume of trade in the market,  1 Q , is: 














  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 5 
When the secondary market at time 1 is perfectly liquid, by following the steps of the proof of 
Lemma 2 for the general case one can show that the time 0 first order condition of (A.11) with 
respect to 0i X  becomes: 
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Proof of Lemma 7 
Equating the values for  0 P  in (14) and (15) yields: 
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 (A.23) 
Substituting for µ  in (14) yields the desired result for  0 P . 




Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson. “Asset Pricing and the Bid-ask Spread.” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 17 (1986), 223-249. 
 
Bhattacharya, U. and M. Spiegel. “Insiders, Outsiders and Market Breakdowns.” Review of 
Financial Studies, 4 (1991), 255-282. 
 
Brennan, M. and A. Subrahmanyam. “Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing: on the 
Compensation for Illiquidity in Stock Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics, 41 
(1996), 441-464. 
 
Caballe, J.and M. Krishnan. “Imperfect Competition in a Multi-security Market with Risk 
Neutrality.” Econometrica 62 (3) (1994), 695-704. 
 
Chordia, T., R. Roll, and A. Subrahmanyam. “Commonality in Liquidity.” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 56 (2000), 3-28. 
 
Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig. “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity.” Journal of Political 
Economy, 91 (1983), 401-419. 
 
Eleswarapu, V.R. and M.C. Reinganum. “The Seasonal Behavior of the Liquidity Premium in 
Asset Pricing.” Journal of Financial Economics, 34 (1993), 373-386. 
 
Gibson, R. and N. Mougeot. “The Pricing of Systematic Liquidity Risk: Empirical Evidence 
from the U.S. Stock Market.” Working paper, University of Zurich (2000). 
 
Glosten, L. “Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of the Monopolist Specialist.” Journal of 
Business, 62 (1989), 211-235. 
 
Grossman, S.J. and J.E. Stiglitz. “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets.” 
American Economic Review, 70 (1980), 393-408. 
 
Hasbrouck, J. and D.J. Seppi. “Common Factors in Prices, Order Flows and Liquidity.” Journal 
of Financial Economics, 59 (2001), 383-411. 
 
Huberman, G. and D. Halka. “Systematic Liquidity.” Journal of Financial Research, 24 (2001), 
161-178. 
 
Karpoff, J.M. “A Theory of Trading Volume.” Journal of Finance, 41 (1986), 1069-1087. 
 
Lo, A.W. and J. Wang. “Trading Volume: Definitions, Data Analysis, and Implications of 
Portfolio Theory.” Review of Financial Studies, 13 (2000), 257-300. 
  
  43
Madhavan, A. “Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets.” Journal of Finance, 47 (1992), 
607-641. 
 
Michaely, R. and J. Vila. “Trading Volume with Private Valuation: Evidence from the Ex-
dividend Day.” Review of Financial Studies, 9 (1995), 471-510. 
 
Michaely, R., J. Vila, and J. Wang. “A Model of Trading Volume with Tax-induced 
Heterogeneous Valuation and Transaction Costs.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 5 
(1996), 340-371. 
 
Milgrom, P. and N. Stokey. “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge.” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 26 (1982), 17-27. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission. “Discounts Involved in Purchases of Common Stock.” 
Institutional Investor Study Report  (1971). 
 
Silber, W.L. “Discounts on Restricted Stock: the Impact of Illiquidity on Stock Prices.” 
Financial Analysts Journal, 1991, 60-64. 
 
Spiegel, M. and A. Subrahmanyam. “Informed Speculation and Hedging in a Noncompetitive 
Securities Market.” Review of Financial Studies, 5 (1992), 307-330. 
 
Tkac, P.A. “A Trading Volume Benchmark: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 34 (1999), 89-114. 
 
Tobin, J. “The Theory of Portfolio Selection.” in Hahn, F. and F. Brechling, (Eds.), The   Theory 
of Interest Rates, MacMillan (1965). 
 
Wruck, K.H. “Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity 
Financings.” Journal of Financial Economics, 23 (1989), 3-28. 